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ABSTRACT
In 2003, Hwang et al. proposed a new blind signature based on the RSA cryptosystem. The Extended Euclidean
algorithm is employed in their proposed scheme. They claimed that the proposed scheme was untraceable and it could
meet all requirements of a blind signature. However, we find that the signer can still trace the blind signature applicant
in some cases. Thus, we present the security flaw of Hwang et al.’s scheme in this paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, Chaum proposed the concept of blind signature
[1]. In blind signature schemes, an applicant can obtain
a signature of a message from the signer without
revealing the content of the signed message to the signer.
Blind signature can be used in many cryptographic
applications, such as electronic voting systems and
electronic cash payment systems. Thus, how to make
the resulting message-signature pair not be able to be
linked is an important issue. On the other hand, the
personal information should be protected while the
resulting message-signature pair is used in any
application. As a result, Chaum proposed the first blind
signature ensuring the user’s private information. With
the progressive improvement of the blind signature [2],
[4]-[6], the requirements of the blind signature, (1)
correctness, (2) blindness, (3) unforgeability, and (4)
untraceability, are listed and described as follows:
(1)
Correctness: Anyone can check the blind
signature of the signed message by using the server’s
public key.
(2)
Blindness: The signer has no idea of the
content of the signed message.
(3)
Unforgeability: Only the signer can generate
the signature. That is, no one can forge a valid signature
and can have the forged signature verified successfully.
(4)
Untraceability: The signer of the blind
signature cannot link the message-signature pair even if
the signature has been revealed to be public.
Recently, Hwang et al. [7] proposed a blind signature
based on the RSA cryptosystem [9]. It also employs the
Extended Euclidean algorithm [8]. They claimed that
the proposed scheme is untraceable and meets all
requirements of a blind signature mentioned above. And
the security of the proposed scheme is based on the
difficulties of solving the factoring problem. However,
in some cases, the signer can still trace the blind
signature applicant. As a result, we present its security
flaw in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we

review Hwang et al.’s untraceable blind signature in
Section 2. Then the drawback of Hwang et al.’s scheme
is shown in Section 3. Finally, the conclusions are given
in Section 4.
2. A REVIEW OF HWANG ET AL.’S
UNTRACEABLE BLIND SIGNATURE
In this section, we review Hwang et al.’s proposed
untraceable blind signature, which consists of five
phases: (1) the initialization phase, (2) the blinding
phase, (3) the signing phase, (4) the unblinding phase,
and (5) the verification phase. The five phases are
presented in Subsections 2.1 to 2.5, respectively.
2.1 The Initialization Phase
In this phase, the signer S makes the essential
information public as follows:
Step 1. S randomly selects two large prime numbers p
and q and computes n = p⋅ q and φ(n) = (p-1)(q-1).
Step 2. S chooses two large random numbers e and d,
where gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, e⋅ d mod φ(n) = 1.
Step3. S keeps p, q, and d secret and makes e, n, and H
public, where H is a one-way hash function—MD5 and
SHA-1 [3] for example.
2.2 The Blinding Phase
Suppose the requester R has a message m and wants m
signed without being known by S. R performs the
following steps to make m concealed.
Setp 1. R randomly selects two distinct numbers t1 and
t2.
Step 2. R chooses two random primes a1 and a2, where
gcd(a1, a2) = 1.
Step 3. R computes s 1 = t 1 e ⋅ H(m) a1 mod n and s2
= t 2 e ⋅ H(m) a 2 mod n.
Step 4. R sends s1 and s2 to S.
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2.3 The Signing Phase

Step 3. S sends (r1, r2, b1, b2) to R.

After getting s1 and s2 from R, S generates the
corresponding blind signature of m as follows:
Step 1. S randomly chooses two primes b1 and b2, where
gcd(b1, b2) = 1.

Third, as shown in the unblinding phase, R gets (m, s),
where s = H(m)d mod n. After performing the above
procedures several times, S can get (s1, s2)’s and (s1d

Step 2. S computes r1 = s1 mod n and r2 = s 2
mod n.
Step 3. S sends (r1, r2, b1, b2) to R.
b1d

b 2d

and s 2 = t 2 e ⋅ H(m) a 2 mod n ,

we can have s1d =

t1* (H (m) d ) a1 mod n and s2d = t2* (H (m) d ) a 2 mod n.
That is, S can collect all the (t1* (H(m) d ) a1 mod n,

2.4 The Unblinding Phase

t2* (H(m) d ) a 2 mod n )’s.

Upon receiving (r1, r2, b1, b2), R performs as follows to
derive the blind signature s of m.
Step 1. R computes g1 = r1 ⋅ t 1

mod n, s2d mod n)’s. Because s 1 = t 1 e ⋅ H(m) a1 mod n

− b1

mod n and g2 = r2⋅

t 2 − b 2 mod n.
Step 2. R finds w and t according to Extended Euclidean
Algorithm [3], where (a1b1)w + (a2b2)t = 1, and keeps b1,
b2, w, and t secret.
Step 3. R computes s = g1w⋅ g2t mod n and then
publishes (m, s).

2.5 The Verification Phase
In order to verify the signature s of m, the verifier V
computes H(m) and se mod n. Then V checks whether
H(m) = se mod n holds or not. If it holds, it denotes that
s is indeed the signature of m.
3. THE SECURITY FLAW OF HWANG ET AL.’S
UNTRACEABLE BLIND SIGNATURE
In this section, we are going to show how the signer
traces the blind signature in Hwang et al.’s proposed
scheme. To make tracing the blind signature easier, S
chooses two primes p and q, where 4|p+1 and 4|q+1,
and computes n = p⋅ q and φ(n) = (p-1)*(q-1). Then S
randomly chooses two large numbers e and d, where
gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, e⋅ d mod φ(n) = 1.

Now, suppose that S knows (m′, δ), where δ = H(m′)d
mod n. If t1, t2, and (H(m)d mod n) are co-prime and a1 <
a2 possibly, S can find the relation between (s1d mod n,
s2d mod n) and δ as follows:
Step 1. S computes gcd(t1* (H(m) d ) a1 mod n , t2*
(H(m) d ) a 2 mod n )= H (m) d*a1 mod n.

Step 2. S computes η = ( H(m) d*a1 mod n ) * δ mod n.
Step 3. S computes
c1 = η (p+1)/4 mod p,
c2 = (p - η (p+1)/4) mod p,
c3 = η (q+1)/4 mod q,
c4 = (q- η (q+1)/4) mod q,
x = q(q-1 mod p), y = p(p-1 mod q),
β1 = (xc1+yc3) mod n,
β2 = (xc1+yc4) mod n,
β3 = (xc2+yc3) mod n, and
β4 = (xc2+yc4) mod n [8].
Step 4. If there exists a βj such that βi* δ(φ(n)/2) = βj mod
n, where i ≠ j and 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4, this denotes that δ is
(H (m) d ) a1 mod n ,
t2*
related
to
(t1*
(H(m) d ) a 2 mod n ).

Second, as shown in the signing phase, S generates the
corresponding blind signature of m as follows:
Step 1. S chooses two random primes b1 and b2, where
gcd(b1, b2) = 1.

If m=m′, we have
η= (H(m) d ) a1 +1 mod n .
(1)
Because a1 is odd, a1+1 is an even number. As a result,
η= ((H(m) d ) ( a1 +1) / 2 ) 2 mod n .
(2)
Equation (2) can be rewritten as the follow equation.
η= (((H(m) d ) ( a1 +1) / 2 ) 2 mod n ) * (H(m) φ( n ) mod n ) mod
n.
(3)
Since m = m′, we have
η= (((H (m) d ) (a1 +1) / 2 ) 2 mod n ) * (H(m′)φ(n) mod n)
mod n
(4)
d ( a1 +1) / 2
φ(n)/2
2
((
H
(
m
)
)
mod
n
)
=(
* (H(m′)
mod n)) mod
n.
(5)
According to the above equation, we can get
η1/2 = ((H(m) d ) ( a1 +1) / 2 mod n ) * (H(m′)φ(n)/2 mod n)
mod n.
(6)
From Equation (1), we have
η1/2 = ((H(m) d ) ( a1 +1) / 2 mod n ) . (7)

Step 2. S computes r1 = s1 b1d mod n and r2 = s 2 b 2d
mod n.

According to the properties of Rabin’s [8], we know

First, as shown in the blinding phase, R has a message
m and wants m signed without being known by S. Then,
R performs as follows:
Setp 1. R randomly selects two distinct numbers t1 and
t2.
Step 2. R chooses two random primes a1 and a2, where
gcd(a1, a2) = 1.
Step 3. R computes s1 = t 1e ⋅ H(m) a1 mod n and s2 = t2e
⋅ H(m) a 2 mod n.
Step 4. R sends s1 and s2 to S.
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there exist at most four distinct solutions for η1/2 mod n.
That is, at least one βi will equal to
((H(m) d ) ( a1 +1) / 2 mod n ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. Therefore, if m
= m′, we have
βj =βi * (H(m′)φ(n)/2 mod n) mod n (8)
= βi *δφ(n)/2 mod n.
(9)
As a result, S checks whether any βi* δ(φ(n)/2) = βj mod n
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 4 and i ≠ j, in Step 4.
According to the above procedures, it is obvious that S
can trace the blind signature in Hwang et al.’s proposed
blind signature scheme.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Hwang et al. proposed a new blind signature based on
the RSA cryptosystem by employing the Extended
Euclidean algorithm. Though they claimed that the
proposed scheme was untraceable and it could meet all
requirements of a blind signature, however, we find that
the signer can still trace the blind signature applicant in
some cases. On the other hand, the computation load of
Hwang et al’s scheme is too heavy. There still exists
space for improving the proposed blind signature
scheme.
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